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Coke, the statute, wives and lovers: routes to a harsher interpretation of the Statute of 
Westminster II c. 34 on dower and adultery 
 
 
In the Statute of Westminster II (1285) c.34, it was enacted that a widow could lose 
her action of dower, and the possibility of claiming the usual proportion of her 
deceased husband’s real property, if, while he was alive, she had left him for a lover, 
and the married couple had not been reconciled during the husband’s life.1 This new 
exception to the action of dower represented an important change in the balance 
between a widow and her husband’s heir, or others with an interest in lands she might 
claim as her dower, and is therefore of great significance to the history of women, law 
and property in the common law world. The exception remained part of the law of 
England until dower itself was abolished in 1925,2 but, although the early years of the 
exception have been explored,3 its later history is less well known. As this paper will 
show, there was a slow and contested move away from the early literal and relatively 
‘widow-friendly’ interpretation of c.34 to a purposive, more moralising and much 
more ‘widow-unfriendly’ view, influenced by the opinion of Sir Edward Coke (1552-
1634), and encouraged by a number of other legal and social factors.  
 
The change explained and illustrated 
 
1 Statutes of the Realm I, 87:  si sponte reliquerit virum suu[m] & abierit & moretur cum adultero suo, 
amittat imperpetuum accionem petendi dotum suam ... si super hoc convincetur ... ‘. [a wife proved to 
have left her husband of her own free will and to have gone to live with ‘her adulterer’ would lose her 
action to claim dower] – unless the husband had been reconciled with her and had allowed her to 
cohabit with him again, the reconciliation being voluntarily on his part and without ecclesiastical 
coercion. 
2 Administration of Estates Act 1925 s. 45 (c). 
3 P. Brand, ‘“Deserving” and “undeserving” wives: earning and forfeiting dower in medieval England’, 
JLH, 22 (2001), 1-20; G. Seabourne, ‘Copulative complexities: the exception of adultery in medieval 
dower actions’, in M. Dyson and D. Ibbetson (eds), Law and Legal Process (Cambridge, 2013, 
forthcoming). 
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The issue of interpretation which will be discussed is whether, in order to 
make out the c.34 exception and bar the widow from her dower action, the tenant 
(defendant) had to plead and show both that she had left her husband willingly and 
also that she had remained away, living with an adulterer, or whether it sufficed for 
the tenant to plead and show that the claimant had lived away in adultery, whatever 
might have been the circumstances of her departure.4 It seems likely that women who 
left their husbands would often have ended up in adulterous relationships, because, 
unless she managed to obtain a full annulment (divorce a vinculo matrimonii), a 
woman who had left her husband would be unable to marry again, so that any sexual 
relationship which she formed during her husband’s life would necessarily be 
adulterous. Given the disabilities associated with continued ‘coverture’, economic 
necessity as much as desire might prompt a woman to seek a male protector.5 If 
adultery was a likely outcome, sooner or later, after a woman left her husband, the 
interpretation of c.34 could make a great difference to widows who had lived 
separately from their husbands. One interpretation – the conjunctive, or ‘widow-
friendly’ interpretation of the statutes, giving full effect to the ‘and’ between the 
requirement of voluntary leaving and that of staying away in adultery – allowed the 
widow to argue against the exception that she had not left willingly, having been 
forced out by her husband, or else abducted. The alternative, ‘widow-unfriendly’ 
interpretation, by concentrating on the adulterous living away, disallowed the 
circumstances of the claimant’s departure as an effective argument against the 
exception. Under this interpretation, however involuntary or coerced the woman’s 
departure might have been, she would be vulnerable to a c.34 exception to her dower 
action if she ever lived in adultery thereafter. 
 
4 See, e.g. the claims of beating, mistreatment and injury in Matilda, widow of Nicholas Credelman, v. 
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 The change is well illustrated by two contrasting cases. In the first, Simon de 
Lyndeseye and Isabel his wife v. Ralph son of William (1307), it was argued that the 
action of dower should be barred because Isabel had left her first husband, John, ten 
years before his death, and had gone from their home in Westmorland to ‘her 
adulterer’, Simon, in Yorkshire, and that there had been no subsequent reconciliation 
with John. Simon and Isabel argued that the action of dower should not be barred, 
because she had not left willingly. Rather, John had removed her from himself with 
force and would not let her come back. Staunton J. looked at the statute and consulted 
Hengham, closely involved in its creation, before announcing that, for the exception 
to succeed, a tenant had to plead and show both willing departure and staying away 
from the husband.6 Logically, therefore, if the widow could resist one of these 
contentions, the exception would not be made out. 
More than five and a half centuries later, Woodward v Dowse (1861) came to a 
very different conclusion.7 Henrietta, widow of John Woodward, claimed land in 
Lincolnshire. The c.34 adultery exception was made, alleging that Henrietta had lived 
adulterously with one John Cabourn. Henrietta alleged in replication that she had been 
forced to leave by her husband’s cruelty, which rendered cohabitation with him 
unsafe, and that she had been unable to return because of this cruelty and because of 
her husband’s living in adultery ‘with a woman named Hibbins’. The court, however, 
decided that, in order to make an effective reply to an exception under Westminster II 
c. 34, a widow needed to deny both leaving her husband willingly and also living in 
adultery after the separation. The job of the tenant was, therefore, made considerably 
easier and that of the claimant rather more difficult than would have been the case 
 
William Fouke (1373) TNA (The National Archives) CP 40/455 m. 454.  
5 See Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 4th edn (London, 2002), 483-9.  
6 Seipp 1307.067rs; YB 35 Edw. I Trin. pl. 5; CP 40/164 m. 251, Simon de Lyndeseye and Isabel his 
wife v. Ralph son of William. 
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under the Lyndeseye interpretation of the statute, and this more ‘widow-unfriendly’ 
view became orthodoxy in England thereafter.8  
These two cases show a stark contrast in approach to interpretation of c.34. 
The remainder of this article will chart, and seek to explain, the change. It will begin 
to do so by focusing on the views of Sir Edward Coke on this issue, which formed one 
of the factors contributing to the change. 
 
Coke’s treatment of c.34  
In the second part of his Institutes of the Laws of England,9 published 
posthumously in 1642, though probably written before 1630,10 Coke claimed that 
when a widow claimed dower, her action could be barred by any period of living in 
adultery after her departure from her husband (without subsequent reconciliation), and 
that it was not necessary for the tenant also to plead or show her voluntary elopement.  
‘[A]lbeit the words of this branch lie in the conjunctive, yet if the woman be 
taken away not sponte but against her will, and after consent, and remain with 
the adulterer without being reconciled etc., she shall lose her dower, for the 
cause of the bar of dower is not the manner of the going away, but the 
remaining away with the adulterer in adultery without reconciliation.’11 
 
In this passage, Coke admitted that his view did not amount to a straightforward, 
literal, reading of the clause, in which the words were clearly ‘in the conjunctive’. He 
took a purposive, ‘equitable’ or anti-literalist, approach to interpretation in this 
instance, deciding that women’s adultery rather than their desertion and adultery was 
the real mischief against which the act should be taken to have been aimed.  
 
7 10 Common Bench Reports (NS) 722 
8 Bostock v. Smith (1864) 4 Beavan 57; National Archives (TNA) C 16/118/B109. 
9 A. Musson, ‘Sir Edward Coke and his Institutes of the Laws of England: an exercise in Legal  
History?’ Archives 31 (2006) 95-107, 95.  
10 J.H. Baker, ‘Coke’s Notebooks and the sources of his reports’ The Legal Profession and the 
Common Law (Hambledon, London and Ronceverte, 1986) 177-203, 195.  
11 2 Inst. 435. 
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Since contemporary opinion was open to purposive or ‘equitable’ 
interpretations of statutes, such an approach cannot be assumed to have been 
illegitimate just because it did not take the statute’s words at face value,12  but it is 
interesting to note that, in this area, Coke appears to have varied his approach between 
literalism and purposive interpretation,13 making it hard to escape the conclusion that 
he was prepared to choose whichever approach provided the doctrine which he 
wished to set out. In this case, his preferred doctrine seems to have been that which 
would reduce the chances of dower for widows suspected or accused of adultery, 
whose husbands had not forgiven them their apparent or actual offence.14 
The interpretation of Westminster II c.34 which Coke favoured, concentrating on 
the accusation of adultery rather than the circumstances of a woman’s departure from 
her husband, was not the dominant interpretation for a considerable period after the 
passing of the statute,15 appears not to have been adopted by the profession in the 
 
12 F. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation  (London, 2002), 400, 401, 406; Eyston v Studd (1574) 2 
Plowden 459, 75 ER 692; Stradling v Morgan (1560) 1 Plowd 199, 75 ER 305; 1 Co Inst 24b;4 Inst 
330; Heydon’s case, (1584) 3 Co. Rep 7a, 7b. Blackstone, Commentaries, iii, 222; Baker, ‘Coke’s Note 
Books’, 194. 
13 He took a very literal line on the requirements for showing reconciliation under c. 34, but a 
purposive, anti-literal approach when considering what had to be shown in order for the exception to be 
made out. In both cases, he chose the interpretation which was less favourable to the widow. Likewise, 
(II, 436) while was not prepared to follow the wording of the statute in insisting that both willing 
leaving and staying away had to be shown, he used close study of the statute’s words to assert that the 
woman did not need to remain in adultery: as long as she committed it, once, that would be a ‘tarrying’ 
within the statute, even if the adulterer subsequently kept her against her will. 
14 In his first Institute, Coke was, however, relatively generous with regard to the lands to which dower 
would apply, in cases of reconciliation after an adulterous elopement: Co. Litt. 33a note 8, Menvill’s 
Case, 13 Co. Rep. 33; see M. Phillips, ‘Dower: effect of adulterous separation and subsequent 
condonation’, Intramural Review of New York University, 7 (1952), 262-4, 262. 
15 See Seabourne, ‘Copulative complexities’. Note also that cases of the mid-fourteenth century suggest 
that there was greater emphasis on the elopement aspect than the adultery aspect of pleading. In Seipp 
1330.607 (JUST 1/633 m.53; YB 4 Edw. III Hil. pl. 158), Scrope C.J. stated that the tenant ‘need not 
specify the time or place where [the woman] lived with her lover, but only the place where she left her 
husband’.  In Seipp 1332.104, which I identify as Eufemia  widow of John le Breton v. John de 
Heselarton and William de la Pole (1332) CP 40/291, unnumbered membrane between m.173 and 174, 
the widow attempted to argue that the tenant was obliged to plead that she had remained away in 
adultery, and that failure to do so rendered the exception ineffective. This did not succeed, however, 
and the widow was driven to plead that she did not leave her husband as mentioned. See also Seipp 
1329.086 YB T. 3 Edw III, f. 23b pl. 9, which I identify with CP 40/278 m. 21J. Rastell, Termes de la 
Ley (London, 1527, 1636) p. 142 definition of ‘elopement’.  
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fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,16  and was probably not the undisputed view in 
Coke’s own day. A high-profile contemporary case was decided the other way. In 
Grene v Harvye (1614), a London case,17  the claimants succeeded in recovering 
Eleanor Grene’s dower despite the fact that, during the life of her deceased first 
husband, William Harvye, gentleman, she had, unarguably, committed adultery by 
‘marrying’, and living with, two further husbands. Her win can only be ascribed to her 
success in negating the allegation of voluntary leaving of William Harvye, her story 
being that William was ‘removed from her by his friends’, who led her to believe that 
he was dead, and, perhaps, encouraged her to remarry. Despite the well-documented 
problems with contemporary law reporting,18 it is hard to believe that Coke did not 
know of this scandalous case involving important London citizens, (including 
Sebastian Harvye, citizen, alderman, and later mayor of London),19 particularly since 
the Judges of the Bench had been involved in an early part of proceedings, to decide a 
jurisdictional point.20 
Coke would also be aware that early-modern attempts to legislate for women to 
lose their dower (and sometimes other property) when found guilty of adultery, 
without a necessary requirement of elopement, in 1543, 1601, and 1614, had failed.21 
 
16 See S.E. Thorne (ed.), Readings and Moots at the Inns of Court, Selden Society 71 (1952) 1954 
pp. 97, lxxviii, lxxxi, lxxxiii, lxxxvi, xcii; A. Fitzherbert, La Nouel Natura Breuium, (London, 1534), 
171. 
17 TNA CP 40/1945 m. 1559, William Grene and Eleanor his wife v Sebastian Harvye and Maria his 
wife; C. Viner, A General Abridgement of Law and Equity (London, 1792) 23 vols,  IX, 241. 
18 Musson, ‘Sir Edward Coke’, 100; D. Ibbetson, ‘Law reporting in the 1590s’ in C. Stebbings (ed.), 
Law Reporting in Britain (London 1995), 73-4, 80-7. 
19 Sir Sebastian Harvye or Harvey, son of a mayor and himself an alderman 1609, sheriff 1609-10, 
mayor 1618-19: W. Thornbury, Old and New London vol. I, ((London, 1878), 400; A.P. Beaven, The 
Aldermen of the City of London  Temp. Henry III – 1912 (London, 1908), 179.  
20 This case falls into the period of Coke’s lost notebooks: the manuscripts designated F and G in 
Baker’s study. J.H. Baker, ‘Coke’s Notebooks and the sources of his reports’ The Legal Profession and 
the Common Law (Hambledon, London and Ronceverte, 1986) 177-203, 180.  
21 K. Thomas, ‘The Puritans and adultery: the act of 1650 reconsidered’, in D. Pennington and K 
Thomas, (eds), Puritans and Revolutionaries, (Oxford, 1978), 257-82; Lords Journal  i, 215, 221, 224, 
226; S. D’Ewes, The Journals of all the Parliaments during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, 
(London,1682), 641; W. Notestein, F.H. Relf and H. Simpson (eds), Debates 1621, 7 vols, (New 
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He could, therefore, be seen to have been attempting to do through the medium of 
legal commentary what neither case law nor legislation had done. The fact that he 
would express such a view as if it were uncontroversial is not, however, surprising, 
given other examples of his writings’ tendentious nature, and, at times, inaccuracy.22  
Although Coke’s view, that it was adultery rather than leaving which was (and 
had always been) the key issue in these cases, was contrary to previous 
interpretations, similar ideas could be deduced from some older sources.  
The thirteenth-century treatise Britton set out advice to defendants in using the  
adultery exception –  
‘On purra dire qe ele ad dowarie deservi et forfet per soen avouterie, car ele 
s’en ala [de soen mari] a autri lit puis ceo qe il la esposa, et issi forfet ele 
dowarie...’ 23    
 
This was later read as suggesting that the issue is not whether the initial leaving was 
or was not a voluntary departure: the wife had in fact gone from her husband to a 
lover’s bed, and that was enough. It could equally be seen, however, as implying a 
quick transfer from husband's bed to lover’s, and therefore a purpose at the time of 
leaving which would qualify the departure as voluntary, as c.34 requires. ‘S’en ala’ 
also suggests purpose and independence on the part of the woman. The passage in 
Britton, then, provides only equivocal support for Coke’s interpretation. 
Another source which apparently supports Coke’s view, and of which much is 
made in Coke’s Institutes, is Paynel’s Case (1302).24 In the Parliament Rolls’ entries 
relating to this sensational and much-cited case, it is noted that dower was claimed, 
 
Haven, 1935),vii, 629. A great desire to act against adultery persisted in some circles, leading to 
success in passing penal legislation against adultery later in the seventeenth century: see further below. 
22 Musson, ‘Sir Edward  Coke’, 103.  
23 F. Nicholls (ed.), Britton, vol. II, p. 281. A [tenant] may say that she has forfeited and lost dower by 
her adultery, in that she went away from her husband after he married her for the bed of another, and so 
she forfeited her dower. 
24  CP 40/130 m. 154d (1299); RP I, 146-7 (1302); F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, The History of 
English Law before the time of Edward I , second edn., 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1968), 
vol. II, 395-6.  
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the adultery exception was made and the claimant argued that the exception did not 
apply because, rather than there having been an elopement and adultery, the wife had 
been ‘demised’ to the alleged adulterer by her husband. This argument was 
unsuccessful. The case, however, is not clear evidence that adultery was the real focus 
of the statutory exception, and that, therefore, as Coke argued, it would always be 
necessary for a claimant to negate adultery, even when her case was that she was 
driven off by her husband, and so did not elope.25 Paynel’s Case seems better 
explained as a decision exploring the word sponte,26 and deciding that, if leaving is 
not against the husband’s will, that does not stop it being sponte as far as the wife is 
concerned.  The claimants’ case did not, in fact, amount to an allegation that the 
departure was involuntary on the woman’s part – merely that, as demonstrated by the 
transfer, it was not against the will of the husband.27 The victorious view in the 
Lyndeseye case (which Coke did not discuss)28 was contrary to his view and to his 
interpretation of Paynel’s Case. It is hard to imagine that the judges in Lyndeseye had 
not heard of Paynel, and it therefore seems unlikely that Paynel was understood by 
contemporaries to support the meaning which Coke would attach to it. 
Coke’s view had antecedents in unsuccessful arguments run by lawyers in 
other early cases. The idea that a woman who had left her husband, however 
blamelessly, could lose her dower action under the c.34 exception if she subsequently 
 
25 In a connected plea roll entry, the widow denied adulterous elopement, explaining that she had been 
living with William, the alleged adulterer, for innocent reasons, for her sustenance and that of her 
(legitimate) children, bringing herself within the same category as a number of previous widows. The 
case set out in the Parliament Rolls, however, was both fuller and stranger, relying on the deceased 
husband’s ‘demise’ of Margaret (rather than, as in the Plea Roll, a piece of land), to William, and using 
this to deny that Margaret had lived with William in adultery. TNA CP 40/130 m. 154 (1299). For later 
confirmation that a ‘wife demise’ did not assist a claimant in such cases, see Coot v Berty, 12 Mod. 
232. 
26 ‘willingly’ – a requirement of c.34. 
27 One might wonder why this was thought to be an argument against the exception: was a departure 
with the husband’s consent not really a departure from him, or was the wife’s will thought to be 
overborne by the husband’s to such an extent that, if he consented to the departure, it could not truly be 
regarded as sponte on her part?   
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lived in adultery was a significant argument or dissenting view in a number of cases, 
and there are signs of it in other legal sources. The view that the onus was on the 
widow to negative both voluntary leaving and adulterous living was argued in some 
fourteenth century cases, from Lyndeseye, through Ropet v Anon (1309X1320),29 to, 
perhaps, Anon (1345).30   The issue was revisited in Tyryngton  v. Beauchamp (1369), 
a case which Coke does cite (from the Year Book report). Here, a dower claim was 
made, the c.34 exception was pleaded, and the claimants stated in replication that the 
widow had been abducted rather than having left sponte. Though they had not made a 
specific denial that she had lived in adultery, their pleading certainly passed the 
requirement set by Lyndeseye. The tenant’s serjeant, however, said that remaining, by 
her free will, without reconciliation, would have been enough to forfeit the dower. 
The claimants contended that, since the statutory defence was ‘copulative’, they need 
only traverse the elopement. Rather than straightforwardly following Lyndeseye’s line 
and agreeing, however, the court found that the widow’s pleading amounted to a 
traverse of both willing leaving and willing staying away. Coke cited the Year Book 
report of Tyryngton in support of his position,31 but, although they show some support 
for the view later taken by Coke, neither this nor the Plea Roll entry justifies the 
proposition that a plea of non-sponte departure is not enough to resist the c.34 
exception. At its furthest stretch, its conclusion was that, if the woman has, on a 
common sense reading of her pleading, denied both elements, the tenant cannot make 
the argument that she has failed in the common law requirement of symmetry in 
 
28 Note that the failure to examine cases in the Plea Rolls may be understandable, due to the ‘chaotic’ 
state of the public records in Coke’s day: Musson, ‘Sir Edward Coke and his Institutes’,  97. 
29 Seipp 1315.120ss, D.D. Sutherland, The Eyre of Northamptonshire 3 –4 Edward III (1329-30), 2 
vols. (London, Selden Society,1983), vol. II ,793-4.  
30 Seipp 1345.104rs; YB 19 Edw. III Trin, pl. 5.  
31 Coke II Inst. 435, referring to YB 43 Edw. III f. 19. 
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pleading and denying everything the opposition alleges.32 Coke’s view was 
foreshadowed in the losing side’s argument in this case, and in Lyndeseye, but was 
certainly not endorsed. 
A tendency towards Coke’s view can also be seen in the raptus statute of 
1382, which moved away from the 1285 formulation (barring women from dower if 
they left and lived in adultery, and were not reconciled), instead barring their land 
actions if they had ‘consented’ after a ravishment, despite any earlier lack of consent 
to the separation from the husband.33 The statute appears to have been unpopular, 
however, and did not displace Westminster II c.34 in the dower context.34 Thus, its 
focus on adultery rather than leaving did not render obsolete the c.34 insistence that it 
was necessary to show or plead voluntary leaving of the husband by the wife before a 
tenant could resist a widow’s claim for dower.  
 Although Coke’s view was not wholly unprecedented, therefore, it could not 
claim strong foundations in legal orthodoxy. That being so, it is worth asking why he 
might have been so keen to put forward as uncontroversial this particular ‘widow-
unfriendly’ interpretation. 
An initial point to note is that it was part of a pattern which saw Coke twisting 
a Latin aphorism in order to go beyond c.34’s specific bar for leaving and adultery 
and to link dower to proper behaviour by a woman,35 taking a line inconsistent with 
 
32 This case was as much about integrating a copulative statutory provision into the common law 
pleading rules as it was about interpretation of the statute itself. On pleading, see Baker, Introduction, 
76-8. 
33  6 Ric. II st. 1 c. 6. In Lyndeseye, Herle had argued that the widow’s going to her adulterer (and 
allegedly marrying him during her husband’s life) had demonstrated her willingness to leave in the first 
place. Similar arguments can be seen in Ropet v. Anon, and in Tyryngton. 
34 See RP, vol. 4, p. 408b, and, e.g., Ralph Haworth esq. and Lady Anne Powes his wife v John Herbert 
and his wife 73 ER 235, 2 Dyer 106b.  
35 Co. Litt., 31 citing a maxim attributed to Ockham, describing dos as praemium pudoris, i.e. a reward 
or recompense for decency or modesty.  Again, Coke is straining a point by using a quotation which is 
probably about pecuniary or chattel dowry and nothing to do with land-based, common law dower to 
back up his assertions on this English institution. On dowries and the medieval academic discourse to 
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older case law when he asserted that a wife who departed from her husband but 
remained on his land would be barred of her dower action under Westminster II c.34 
(despite a medieval case which, as he acknowledged, said the opposite), and in 
claiming that a widow who lied about a pregnancy could lose her dower.36 Coke did 
not express a general aversion to the idea of dower, and some of his decisions were 
relatively favourable to widows,37 but the uncondoned prior sexual misdemeanours of 
dower-claiming widows seems to have aroused very strong feelings in him. 
  It is very tempting to see in his insistence on a hard line against adulterous 
women claiming dower some influence of his personal circumstances. It does not 
seem unlikely that his ill-fated second marriage, with its disputes over matters 
including property, and his wife’s rumoured infidelity, might have hardened his views 
against wives and their provision in the event of a husband’s death.38 Furthermore, it 
seems possible that the misadventures of Coke’s daughter Frances (Lady Purbeck) 
might have had some influence on his opinions. Frances, whom Coke had married off 
for political reasons and against her own wishes and those of her mother, did not 
enjoy conjugal bliss. She was found guilty of adultery in 1627, having left her 
possibly insane husband for another man, and was sentenced to humiliating public 
penance.39 Either anger with her for the disgrace she had brought upon him, or a wish 
 
which the idea quoted in Coke more properly belongs, see I.P. Wei, ‘Gender and sexuality in medieval 
academic discourse: marriage problems in Parisian quodlibets’, Mediaevalia 31 (2011) 5-34. 
36 Coke, Institutes. II, 435-6. 
37 See above, note 14. Dower was relatively easily avoided in Coke’s era, by employing the jointure, 
and was not the subject of the sort of condemnation which it would receive in the nineteenth century.  
38 See A.D. Boyer, ‘Sir Edward Coke 1552-1634’, C. Matthew and B. Harrison (eds), Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, online edition,  http://www.oxforddnb.com., James I State Papers 
Domestic 1611-18, 468, 469, 471, 495, 515, 530; J. Turner, ‘Concerning divers notable stirs between 
Sir Edward Coke and his lady’, American Law Review 51 (1917) 883-903. 
39 See, e.g. E. Ross, ‘The case of the crying bride: gossip letters about the wedding of Frances Coke’, 
Comitatus 40 (2009), 231-47; Turner, ‘Concerning divers notable stirs’, 883, 900, 902,  
 13 
to be seen to be opposing adultery, given his association with this scandal, might be 
imagined to have contributed to Coke’s harsh line on this issue.40  
  
From Coke to the 1860s 
Coke’s view was not confirmed as orthodoxy until the nineteenth century. 
Partly, as argued above, this was because it did not represent the dominant or 
undisputed view amongst lawyers. Another reason may have been the lack of 
opportunity to debate the issue in a case. Dower remained a possible mode of 
provision for widows until the twentieth century, but there is general agreement that it 
was, in practice, avoided by a significant number of families. The rate of decline in 
the applicability of dower amongst the wealthiest classes, and the extent to which 
dower remained relevant to other sections of society are issues on which there is little  
robust evidence,41 but, at least for the wealthy, upon whom most lawyers and many 
legal historians have concentrated, dower was, from the early modern period, being 
overtaken by other modes of provision, such as trusts in general and, in particular, by 
the jointure.42 Once jointures took hold, there were fewer dower actions, and, 
therefore, fewer opportunities to explore or challenge the accepted, conjunctive, 
interpretation of the c.34 exception. 
 
40 Intriguingly, Frances came to live with her father during the last years of his life, and may even have 
embroidered a cover for some of his legal writings: Baker, ‘Coke’s Notebooks’, 180. It should also be 
borne in mind that Coke’s legal life spanned a time of uncertainty as to the lines which divorce law 
would take in a Protestant England: L Stone, The Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987 (Oxford, New 
York, 1992),  chapter X. Important issues about matrimonial behaviour and the consequences of 
marriage breakdown were ‘up for debate’. 
41 See further below. Note that not all those of high social station avoided dower, and that there were 
cases in which c.34 was pleaded: see Elizabeth Lady Dowager Boyne v Frederick Hamilton (1773) 
Irish Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, 28th August 1773. 
42 The jointure was an alternative to dower. Concluded by agreement rather than arising as of right, it 
gave a widow a life interest in a stipulated amount of property, rather than in the one-third which was 
the rule in dower. See, e.g., Statute of Uses 1536, cc. 4-7, Co. Litt., 37b; Bl. Com. II p. 137. Jointures 
were not subject to an adultery exception: Field v Serres (1804) 1 Bos. & Pul. NR 123; 127 ER 405; 
Sidney v Sidney 3 P Wms 269 (1734) (where the argument was made that equity should follow the law 
and disallow enforcement of marriage articles where there had been adultery on the wife’s part); Blount 
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 Those judges and writers who dealt with the issue after Coke’s time took 
different views, some in clear opposition to his. Coke’s view was not adopted in 
discussions in King’s Bench in Manby v. Scott (1663): here, defence counsel stated 
that adultery without elopement and elopement without adultery were not bars to 
dower.43 
A treatise of 1700, Baron and Feme, gave a mixed message, stating that: 
‘If the wife elope, she is barred of her dower.  If the wife elope from her 
husband, viz. if the wife goeth away and leave her husband, and tarrieth with 
her adulterer, she loseth her dower until her husband willingly and without 
coercion Ecclesiastical be reconciled to her and permit her to cohabit with 
him.44 
 
which appears to require both leaving and living with an adulterer, before noting that: 
‘if the woman be taken away not sponte but against her will, and after consent 
remain with the adulterer, without being reconciled etc., she shall lose her 
dower’.  
 
The latter is contrary to Lyndeseye and in line with Coke. 
 A more straightforwardly conjunctive setting out of the statute, with the 
implication that both elopement and adultery must be proved, is found in Comyns’ 
Digest of the Laws of England (1762).45 Clearly, there was not universal genuflection 
before Coke in the eighteenth century. Gilbert, The Law of Uses and Trusts (1734) did 
not cite Coke on adultery/elopement, though did so in relation to other aspects of 
 
v Winter 3 Cox’s P Wms 276; Ball v Montgomery (1793) 29 ER 924, Richardson v Fry, Morning Post, 
15th May, 1826, CCP. 
43 1 Keble 337 at 341. 83 ER 980, citing the 1572 case of Sir John Stowell (or Stawel) and Mary, his 
wife, on which, see Stone, Road to Divorce, 305, Sir L. Dibdin and Sir C.E.H. Chadwyck Healey, 
English Church Law and Divorce (London, 1912), 82-92, 152-3; G.D. Stawell, ‘A Quantock family: 
the Stawells of Cothelstone and their descendants the barons Stawell of Somerton and the Stawells of 
Devonshire and the County Cork’ (1910). Mary Stowell’s assignment of dower: TNA C142/687/213-5 
44 Baron and Feme: A Treatise of the Common Law concerning Husbands and Wives (London, 1700), 
90.   
45 Comyns’ Digest of the Laws of England (1762). 
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dower.46 Viner’s General Abridgment gave Coke’s view, and no doubt popularised 
it,47 but Blackstone set out an apparently ‘copulative’ test.48 
  An important step towards the acceptance of Coke’s view was taken in 
Hethrington v. Graham (1829).49 In a claim for dower, the adultery exception was 
made. The widow replied that, while she did leave of her own free will, it was with 
her husband’s consent, and, if there had been adultery with the party named, it had 
been during the period of that mutually agreed separation. Hers was a weak case, in 
that the statute required the wife’s leaving to be sponte, not ‘against her husband’s 
will’, and, here, she seems to describe a consensual separation, so not denying her 
own volition, but stating that her husband was also agreeable to the separation.50 The 
case could, therefore, have been decided on that ground. Wider discussion was, 
however, held. Her serjeant, Wilde, made the argument that a forfeiture statute must 
be construed strictly, and that all elements must be made out. He relied on the fact that 
she had not run off with the adulterer, (though, strictly, the statute does not require 
this). It was the opposing arguments of Serjeant Jones which carried the day, 
however, and, rather than sticking to his rather strong case on the literal construction 
of the statute, he broadened the issue out to opine upon its underlying purpose, saying 
that: 
‘The principle of the statute is the protection of public morals and the punishment 
of the offence of the wife. and the concurrence of all the modes of committing the 
offence specified in the act is not essential to a forfeiture  
 
before going on to cite Coke.  
  
 
46 Gilbert, The Law of Uses and Trusts together with a treatise of dower (London, 1734), p. 402.. 
47 Viner, General Abridgement, vol. IX, 240, 242. 
48 Bl. Comm. Book II c 8, s.1; first edition, (Oxford, 1766) p. 130.  Cites only Co. Litt., not Inst. II, 
435-6. See also the ‘copulative’ interpretation in W. Beawes (ed.), J. Chitty (ed.), Lex Mercatoria, or a 
complete code of commercial law 6th edn, 2 vols, (London, 1813), 1, 694. 
49 6 Bing. 135.   
50 The woman’s case might have been an attempt to argue that the husband’s consent to her going 
meant that she had not, in fact ‘left’ him, but this was not spelled out, and the court did not take it in 
this way. 
 16 
Wilde engaged with the morality argument, with a good riposte that the statute 
was not really about punishment for moral offences, since it countenanced the 
restoration of the wife to her dower if she and her deceased husband had been 
reconciled.  The Lord Chief Justice, however, was not persuaded. It was reported in 
the press that the court had adjourned, ‘as it was a case of old and subtle learning’, so 
that they could ‘look into the authorities and give judgment hereafter’.51 Heavily 
reliant on Coke, and going further than was necessary to decide the case in issue, he 
stated as a matter of ’good sense and policy’ that ‘if a woman committed adultery 
although she might in the first instance have quitted her husband with his consent as 
well as of her own free will, her right to dower ought to be forfeited’.  
Hethrington led to greater acceptance of the Coke line,52 but there were attempts 
to distinguish it,53 and resistance to extending it,54 and the end of the story is really in 
the 1860s with the judgment in Woodward, confirmed in Bostock v Smith. In 
Woodward v. Dowse (1861),55 as noted above, the widow’s action of dower failed, 
and this was despite the fact that it was accepted that she had initially been forced to 
leave by her husband’s cruelty, and that she had been unable to return because of his 
cruelty (which made it unsafe for her to live with him) and his adultery. The tenant’s 
counsel, Serjeant Hayes, cited Coke and his version of Paynel.56 Hayes put forward 
the Coke-like view that ‘the substance must be looked at, not the mere words of the 
 
51 Morning Post 1st July 1829; Morning Chronicle 7th July, 1829. 
52 S. Smith Bell, The Law of Property as arising from the Relation of Husband and Wife (Philadelphia, 
1850), p. 250.  
53 See arguments of Henrietta Woodward’s counsel, Wills, in Woodward v Dowse at 725. 
54 Note also that, in King v King, a court resisted the suggestion that a widow should be barred of her 
dower if she had, as alleged, committed adultery with ‘divers men’ at home (though in the absence of -
and living separately from - her husband, who was confined on grounds of lunacy): King v King, 
Morning Post 22nd February 1837 (Vice Chancellor’s Court). 
55 10 Common Bench Reports (NS) 722. 
56 The discussion of Paynel’s Case caused hilarity in court, laughter breaking out when it was 
mentioned that the wife in the case had been assigned to the alleged adulterer ‘with all her 
appurtenances’: Daily News, 21st June 1861, ‘Law intelligence’. Note that this case was ‘rediscovered’ 
periodically – see, e.g., ‘Sale of Wives’, St James Chronicle or the British Evening Post 19th Jan 1790. 
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statute’. As a back-up, he also claimed that ‘If she be not ravished, the eloignment of 
the wife is sponte’ - a harsh interpretation of what negated volition in a woman’s 
leaving. The suggestion that only abduction would do was clearly contrary to previous 
cases such as Lyndeseye. Williams J agreed with the anti-literalist approach, though 
not for the same reasons as counsel for the tenant. Rather than basing himself on the 
presumed substance of the incident, he felt himself bound by authority as interpreted 
by Coke, saying:   
‘Whatever might be our notion as to the proper construction of the statute in 
question, if we had been called upon to construe it immediately after its 
passing, there can be no doubt that it received soon after that period an 
exposition which has been uniformly acted upon in modern times. I refer to 
the commentary of Lord Coke in 2 Inst. 435. ... That passage was cited and 
received as good law in Hethrington... where the court gave a considered 
judgment.57 
 
He followed Coke in saying that it is not the manner of the going away but the 
remaining away in adultery which counts. Here, the replication amounted to an 
admission of adultery, remaining away without reconciliation, so the statute, he 
decided, barred the widow’s claim in dower.  
Willes J indulged in some moralising, noting that where, as here, a wife was 
mistreated, she was ‘sent forth with authority to pledge [her husband’s] credit, but 
[was] bound to conduct herself properly’. It could not be said that the husband’s 
conduct was the cause of Henrietta’s committing adultery: it was, rather ‘the result of 
her yielding to temptation’. Adopting the low threshold for ‘sponte’ which had been 
suggested by Hayes, he argued that, since Henrietta left her husband ‘without, as it 
appears, being taken away by a third party’ and stayed away, and there was adultery 
and no reconciliation, that was enough to bar her action. 
 
57 p. 64. 
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 Shortly afterwards, the Staffordshire case of Bostock v. Smith (1864)58 
confirmed the hard line and the debt to Coke. After the tenant argued a c. 34 
exception, the claimant’s counsel, Mr Hobhouse, argued that: (i) adultery was not 
proved; and (ii) the woman had not left sponte sua, but had been compelled by the 
cruelty and misconduct of her husband.  
The Master of the Rolls, Sir John Romilly, said that there had been 
unspecified bad treatment and ‘gross misconduct’ by the husband, though, at his 
instruction, the facts relating to this misbehaviour were kept from the report.59 The 
tenant’s counsel cited Coke, Hethrington and Woodward and won the day, the Master 
of the Rolls agreeing that, since the adultery was in fact proved, that was enough for 
the exception to succeed. The cases cited were conclusive, and the widow lost. 
Romilly summed up the harsh and moralising view the courts were now taking in 
such cases: 
‘It is but proper to state that she left her husband in consequence of her 
husband’s behaviour and gross misconduct, which was such as would justify, 
if anything could justify, her act. But nothing could justify it.’  
 
Clearly, they considered, a widow should be made to pay for her unjustified  
 
conduct by losing her action of dower. 
 
 
Why a harsh line might have been more acceptable in the nineteenth century 
Important factors in the acceptance of a harsher line – combining Coke’s 
interpretation of the elements of the exception with an increasingly low threshold of 
volition - appear to have been: a desire to cut down dower in general, changing 
 
58 4 Beavan 57. 
59 Some depositions and other documents relating to this case survive – TNA C 16/118/B109 - but, 
contain no details of the ‘gross misconduct’. 
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judicial conceptions of judges’ own role and that of the law, and a rather reverential 
reliance on Coke.60 
 
 ‘As I am against dower altogether, I wish, if there is to be such a thing, to cut it down 
as low as possible.’61 
In the context of the opinion of dower amongst influential lawyers and members 
of the political class, the move to interpret c.34 of Westminster II in such a way as to 
reduce the likelihood of a widow recovering dower lands is not entirely surprising.  
Although previous generations of lawyers and legislators had at least paid lip-
service to the importance of dower, and the policy of upholding it,62 many nineteenth 
century lawyers openly expressed a dim view of it.63 A frequently-aired set of 
arguments portrayed dower as bad for men, a hindrance on commerce and 
unnecessary or useless, if not actually damaging, to women. Such attitudes are evident 
in the Real Property Commissioners’ First Report from May 1829 and in the 
responses and evidence of many of those contributing to the Commissioners’ inquiry. 
Dower was said to be an incumbrance, creating expense and uncertainty for those who 
wished to buy and sell land, a clog on the ideal of free commerce in land. It had 
become ‘highly inconvenient’ because of changed circumstances since the institution 
first appeared; in particular, the more frequent transfer or charging of estates in the 
 
60 Theory of statutory interpretation was a matter of debate in the nineteenth century, with different 
emphases placed on literalism and purposive interpretation. see, e.g., F. Dwarris, General Treatise on 
Statutes and Their Interpretation (1835). 
61 First Report of the Real Property Commissioners (1829), House of Commons Sessional Papers 1829, 
x.1. p. 408 Nassau William Senior esq.. See also : J.A. Christie, p. 274. 
62 See, e.g., Statute of Uses, preamble, Banks v Sutton (1732), 2 P. Wms 702-3 on the wife’s ‘moral 
right to a dower’. Lawyers had, however, been content to follow cases which held that there was no 
dower in equitable property, despite the fact that they had a somewhat unconvincing pedigree. Staves, 
Married Women’s Separate Property, 17, c.2; Chaplin v Chaplin (1733) 3 P. Wms 229. Note that, at 
44, she shows that there were cases from the 1650s to 1732, which did allow dower of equitable 
property. 
63 Note, however, that some saw evasion of dower as morally suspect: Hansard HC Debates 14th June, 
1832, col. 698. 
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nineteenth century than in medieval England.64 Recent industrial developments such 
as the increased exploitation of mines could enhance the importance of land as 
opposed to personal property, and dower appeared to many married men a particularly 
unattractive system of provision for widows.65 Dower was argued to be unnecessary 
for widows themselves, since they could now be provided for out of the husband’s 
personal property rather than his realty.66 Commentators argued from the prevalence 
of jointures (which, if made at the correct time, meant that dower was excluded) and 
the fact that, with competent legal advice, it was, in any case, easy to render dower 
inapplicable by conveying land to trustees,67 that dower was outmoded and 
unnecessary. Dower was also said to be injurious to widows, tempting them into 
litigation,68 and to wives, who were obliged to be involved when a man wished to sell 
or mortgage land (an involvement assumed to be detrimental to them).69 The retention 
of dower whilst there were ways of evading it was seen as inefficient in that 
uncertainty as to some of the methods of evasion could encourage litigation and 
expense.  
Increasingly, awarding the widow a fixed share of land at the husband’s death was 
also seen as an unwarranted interference with what ought to be a matter of choice for 
the husband or contract amongst the males of the families of both spouses, rather than 
a matter for set legal rules,70 As Park put it in an influential treatise,  
‘Independence of mind, as well as the finer sensibilities, revolt from the idea of a 
stated compulsory appropriation of property in a case where moral duty and the 
 
64 First Report, 8, 16; Morning Chronicle, 19th June, 1829. 
65 Houghton v Lee, Morning Chronicle, 2nd November, 1807. 
66 First Report, 8, 16. Morning Chronicle, 19th June, 1829. 
67 Dower did not apply to equitable property: J.S. Anderson, ‘Property Law’ in W. Cornish, J.S. 
Anderson, R. Cocks, M. Lobban, P. Polden, K. Smith, Oxford History of the Laws of England Vol. XII: 
1820-1914, Private Law, 1-294, 129.  
68 First Report, 18.  
69 First Report, 491. 
70 First Report, 258. 
 21 
domestic affections, afford a surer pledge among the virtuous than positive 
institutions.’71 
 
The assertion that dower was not much use to widows at this time deserves a 
more thorough investigation than can be given in the confines of this paper.72 A 
number of points may, however, be noted here. Although the Real Property 
Commissioners felt able to state that: 
‘[T]the right to dower exists beneficially in so few instances that it is of little 
value considered as a provision for widows, and we believe it may be 
confidently asserted that it is never calculated on as a provision by females 
who contract marriage, or their friends...’73 
 
some doubt may be raised as to the reliability of such statements on the lack of 
applicability of dower because of the lack of consideration of the views of women or 
of those who did not routinely consult a lawyer. All of the Real Property 
Commissioners and those giving evidence before them were successful lawyers, with 
many being conveyancers in particular,74 and their clienteles seem likely to have been 
drawn from the upper echelons of nineteenth century society. They may well not, 
therefore, have been concerned with, or familiar with, the lives and dealings of those 
landowners who were somewhat lower down the social scale. Secondly, they were all 
male. Some women, at least, had spoken up for dower’s importance, objecting to the 
right being cut down ‘by caprice of their husbands’,75 but women’s opinion went 
unelicited, their voices unheard, at the Commissioners’ inquiry. Thirdly, there are 
some indications of the continued use of dower. For example, one king’s counsel 
 
71 J.J. Park, A Treatise on the Law of Dower (London, 1836), 2.  
72 First Report, 490, John Tyrell: ‘it is not in more than one case out of several hundreds that a widow 
is entitled to dower out of the real estates of her husband.’ 
73 First Report, 17. 
74 M. Sokol, ‘Jeremy Bentham and the Real Property Commission of 1828’ Utilitas 4 (1992) 225-45, 
235. 
75 Morning Post, 4th April 1827, ‘Petition of the Ladies of Great Britain to the Lord Chancellor’. Note 
the letters in the same paper, on following days, supporting the petition.  See also ‘M.S.R’, ‘The 
Property of Married Women’, The Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine, 5 (November, 1856), 234. 
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stated that dower ‘now seldom attaches excepting in cases of smaller estates’,76 
logically supporting the case for dower’s continued importance for some people, and 
another witness said that he had ‘known instances where it has been a happy thing for 
the wife and family that the husband has not had the power of stripping her of her 
pittance of dower’,77 clearly admitting dower’s advantages and importance to 
(impliedly, less well-off) widows.78 Finally, some support for the case for the 
continuing advantage of dower for women may be found in the fact that some men 
might resort to divorcing their wives in order to escape this obligation,79 or to beating 
them into signing it away.80  
Those opposed to dower would have welcomed the fact that, under the Dower 
Act 1833, a widow could, in future, only get dower on lands held by her deceased 
husband at the time of his death and not on those lands which he had transferred 
during his life or willed away to a third party.81  Dower became something which 
affected estates left on an intestacy, and which a man could cut out of the picture with 
competent legal advice.82 Since there was almost certainly a positive correlation 
between wealth and likelihood of making a will, the effect of the Dower Act will have 
been to make dower an issue not for the wealthiest people, but for those with some 
 
76 First Report, 101, W.E. Taunton K.C. 
77 First Report, 390, G. Harrison. 
78 It seems peculiar to note instances of hardship in which women may be left unprovided-for on an 
intestacy where dower does not apply (because the property is equitable) and yet not to see that dower 
might be helpful in similar cases where the property is legal, see, e.g. First Report, p. 491. 
79 See, e.g., Parkes v Creswick, The Age, 25th December 1825, p. 262; Morning Post 23rd  Dec 1825.  
80 Dyott v Dyott, Caledonian Mercury, 17th November, 1814. 
79 81 3 & 4 Wm. IV c. 105. On its effects, see, e.g. ‘The Comic Blackstone’, in Punch, 3rd August, 
1844 p. 63: ‘[A] recent act has made it so easy to bar the dower that the widows are generally done out 
of their thirds, and instead of the corn, the fruit, or even the vegetables, there is nothing left but the 
weeds, with which the unfortunate widows can console themselves.’ There was no requirement that the 
husband make equivalent provision for his widow.  
It had been suggested that the Dower Act’s extension of dower to equitable estates was 
sufficient compensation for the increased ability of men to destroy all dower: HC Debates 1832 vol 13 
c. 561; HC Debates 1833 vol. 15 c. 655. Staves, however, makes a convincing case for saying that this 
was merely a clearing up of an intellectually embarrassing anomaly which saw different rules for 
dower and curtesy in this area: Staves, Married Women’s Separate Property, 39.  
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landed property and no regular legal advice.83 Dower after the Dower Act, it seems, 
occupied a strange position, declining in use amongst the wealthy and well-advised,84 
but still spoken of as if it was a normal part of provision for widows,85 and still used 
and deemed important by some people.86 Judges were prepared to cut dower down, 
for example holding it subject to a limitation period, despite not being mentioned in 
relevant legislation.87 The increasingly harsh interpretation of c.34 can be fitted into 
this trend towards the diminution of dower, by legislation and judicial decision. 
 
A change in mores, and in judges’ attitudes to the role of the law 
  
Changes in this area can be seen as part of a trend towards more punitive legal 
responses to female adultery, dating back to the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
political movements for criminalisation of adultery,88 or even to the 1382 raptus 
statute and losing arguments in fourteenth century cases noted above. An 
intensification, or steep acceleration in this trend can be detected from the late 
 
82 Anderson, Oxford History vol. XII, 129, noting the lack of figures on number of widows claiming 
dower in the nineteenth century.   
83 See, e.g. the case of the widow of a Bristol ‘slop-seller’ in Sanger v Gardner,  Morning Post, 5th  
November, 1823. 
84 Note also that in 1833, legislation streamlined the process of release of claim to dower by the wife: 
Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries 1833; C.S. Kenny, History of the Law of England as to 
the Effects of Marriage on Property (London,1879), 59. 
85 An opponent of reform with regard to married women’s property still used the availability of dower 
as an argument against change in 1868: HC Debates 1868 vol 192 col. 1352. Dower continued to be 
discussed in popular writing on property law and in debate on married women’s property. A. Barrister, 
Every Man’s Own Lawyer (London, 1867). Dower was given as one of the risks of a married man with 
an adulterous wife in speeches relating to the Mordaunt divorce case: Morning Post, 3rd June, 1870; 
Mordaunt v Mordaunt (no 2) (1869-72) LR 2 P & D 109. 
86 As late as 1856, there was a request for its extension to certain copyholders: HL Debates 1856 vol 
140 c 705. In the late 1870s, and even 1912, some parliamentarians were against the cutting down of 
dower, or thought that the Dower Act had gone too far: HC Debates 1876 vol. 230 c.600; HL Debates  
1877, vol. 235 c. 71; HC Debates 1878, c. 1169; HL Debates 1912, vol. 11, c.1015. 
87 Marshall v Smith, Daily News, 7th December 1864. 
88 This was, briefly, and mostly theoretically, achieved in 1650:Acts of the Interregnum II: 388; 
Thomas, ‘The Puritans and adultery’, 258, 272 for attempts to bring in similar punitive legislation in 
1543, 1549, 1576, 1584, 1601, 1604, 1614, 1621, 1626, 1628, 1640, 1644, 1649 and later pressure for 
greater penalties on adulterers from individuals, clergy, societies for the reform of manners, from the 
later seventeenth century to the nineteenth century. See also Stone, Road to Divorce, 243. 
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eighteenth century.89 From that point onwards, assumpsit cases on whether men had 
to support their deserting and/or adulterous wives were increasingly strict: a husband 
did not have to maintain an adulterous wife, even if he had committed adultery 
himself and ‘turned her out without imputation on her conduct’.90 In earlier assumpsit 
cases concerning payment for goods and services supplied to a separated wife, the 
dividing line between a husband’s obligation to maintain and his lack of such 
obligation was the wife’s (voluntary) leaving of her husband, rather than her 
adultery.91 In Govier v Hancock, (1796), however, the focus was placed upon the 
wife’s adultery.92  
An increasing nineteenth century horror at adultery, and particularly the 
adultery of women, has been noted,93 and this was reflected in the increase in awards 
in crim. con. cases, which was seen in the early part of the century,94 and the 
penalising of adulterous wives under the Poor Law.95 There was protest against 
‘rewarding adultery’ by compensating wives divorced by act of Parliament for the 
loss of their dower, jointure or marriage portion. Stone notes a change with regard to 
maintenance for adulterous wives divorced in Parliament, between c. 1811 and 1830, 
increasingly requiring them to remain ‘chaste and alone’.96 Legal opinion against 
adulterous wives succeeding in dower actions may well also have been increased by a 
case from the late 1830s in which a widow appears to have been ‘trying it on’, 
 
89 Stone, Road to Divorce, 255; noting long debates over anti-adultery bills in 1771, 1779, 1800, 1809 
and ( p. 273) the ‘moral panic’ of the 1790s. 
90 Manby v Scott (above), Govier v Hancock (1796) 6 TR 603. See also Harris v Morris,  The Morning 
Post and Gazetteer, 8th July, 1801, ‘Law Intelligence’; Emmett v Norton (1838) 6 Car. & P 506. 
91 Robinson v Gosnold (1704) 6 Mod. 171, 87 ER 927; see similar views from Hale C.B. in Manby v 
Scott (above)..  
92 6 TR 603; 101 ER 726 (another case in which Coke’s views on dower and adultery were relied 
upon). 
93 L. Stone, Broken Lives: separation and divorce in England 1550-1857 (Oxford, 1993), 24; W.E. 
Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind 1830-1870 New Haven (1957). 
94 W. Cornish, Oxford History of the Laws of England vol. XIII, 733; Stone, Road to Divorce, 211-28; 
S Wolfram, ‘Divorce in England’ (1985) OJLS 155-86 at 166-72.   
95 R v Flintan (1830) 1 B & Ad 227 
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arguing that condonation of her previous adultery somehow made c.34 inapplicable 
with regard to her later adultery.97 Strong views, and a wish to visit harsher and more 
certain consequences on female adulterers can be seen in nineteenth century letters in 
relation to dower.98  
In the era of Woodward and Bostock, the debates surrounding the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1857, would be familiar. That act had confirmed that simple adultery by 
the wife was a ground for divorce (while a man’s adultery was not a sufficient 
ground), and debate and coverage had emphasised the horror of women’s adultery and 
its being worse than adultery of men,99 and, as Cretney has noted, disapproval of the 
adulterous wife was reflected in a new lack of generosity in maintenance payments in 
the early years of the new divorce jurisdiction.100 Disapproval of female adultery was 
certainly not new at this time, but the idea that law could do something to punish and 
deter it appears to have been felt with particular intensity in the William IV/Victorian 
era, and this is reflected in some of the moralising statements in the cases considered, 
as well as in their results. 
 
96 Stone, Road to Divorce, 345,  
97 Halliday v Best, Morning Post, 10th November, 1838; 1 Legal Guide 90 (1838-9). 
98 ‘JBW’, Legal Observer or Journal of Jurisprudence 10 (1835), 410, objecting that a forgiving 
(‘weak’) husband could, by reconciling himself to his adulterous wife, ‘bring upon his children an 
injury by diminishing their rights and expectations’. Letters from ‘Carolus’ and ‘Mancuniensis’ in 
Legal Observer or Journal of Jurisprudence 7 (1833-4), 280, 448 (highlighting some misapprehensions 
about the law).See also T. Poynter, Concise View of the Doctrine and Practice of the Ecclesiastical 
Courts on Various Points Relative to the Subject of Marriage and Divorce (Philadelphia, 1836), 65.  
and clergymen showed an unforgiving attitude to it: HC Debates 30 Jul 1857 vol 147 c. 743. 
99 See, e.g., divorce of the earl of Roseberry (1815: Hansard HL Debates 1st  June 1815 vol. 31 c. 558; 
Morning Chronicle, 15th June, 1815; Times, 15th April, 9th, 19th May, 2nd June, 15th June 1815; George 
IV’s attempt to divorce Queen Caroline (1820: W.D. Bowman, The Divorce case of Queen Caroline 
(London, 1930), K. Baker, George IV: a Life in Caricature(London, 2005), 166; TNA TS 11/115; 
Ellenborough  divorce 1830: Times, 18th,  24th, March, 1st 2nd, 6th, 7th, April, 1830; ‘Curious case of 
divorce’, Bell’s Life in London and Sporting Chronicle, 17th February, 1833; Talbot divorce (1856) 
Times, 29th  Feb 1856, 13th March, 23rd May, Cujus pseud. Mary Anne Talbot, Divorce in 1857: the 
Talbot Case (London, 1857); ‘The Robinson Case’, The Englishwoman’s Review and Home 
Newspaper, 27th November, 1858,  311; Codrington v Codrington and Anderson (1864), 3 Sw. and Tr 
368, 496, 4 Sw. and Tr. 63 164 ER 1317, 1367, 1439  (January-April 1864). Times, 21st  November 
1864, 11.; M. Vicinus, ‘Lesbian perversity and Victorian marriage: the Codrington divorce case 1864’, 
Journal of British Studies 36 (1997) 70-98; G. Savage, ‘Erotic stories and public decency: newspaper 
reporting of divorce proceedings in England’, Historical Journal 41 (1998) 511-28. 
100 S. Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century, A History (Oxford, 2003), 393, 405, 407-8. 
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There were, however, limits to what courts felt that they could do. In particular, 
they would not use c.34 to cover jointures as well as dower,101 though some judges 
regretted that they were unable to increase the scope of c.34 in this way. In Goldsmid 
v Heathcote (1864),102 the claimaint was found to have eloped from her husband with 
an army officer, but there had been no divorce. After the husband died, trustees 
objected to paying her under the marriage settlements. It was argued that the situation 
was analogous to Westminster II c. 34, but the Vice Chancellor, with much regret and 
moralising at the impropriety of her conduct, declared that she was entitled under the 
settlements, as they did not bar her in the event of adultery or elopement. Such judges 
found themselves caught between a desire to be more interventionist against 
adulteresses and a disinclination to upset private agreements.  
 
Deference to Coke 
In Woodward: Byles J stated (at 642):  
[M]y acquiescence in the judgment of the court reposes on the deference one 
is always bound to pay to the opinions of that very eminent lawyer, Lord 
Coke.  
 
This passage is but a more open expression of a practice which seems to have become 
prevalent in the period, in many legal writers, and particularly in judges: 
unquestioning reliance on Coke as an authority.103 There was a clear disinclination to 
 
101 See above, note 42. Note also that a leading civilian refused to allow a wife’s adultery to upset her 
claim to a distributive share of personal property. Legal Examiner and Law Chronicle vol 3, 65-84 
(1834).  
102 Morning Post 25th July, 1864; Times, 23rd July, 1864. 
103 On the rising of Coke’s stock in the nineteenth century, see, e.g., Musson, ‘Sir Edward Coke’, 95.; 
J.F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal  Law of England 3 vols, (New York, 1883) II, 205; D. Powell, 
‘Coke in context: early modern legal observation and Sir Edward Coke’s reports’, Journal of Legal 
History 21 (2000), 33-53; 45, 48.Coke relied upon in, e.g., J.J. Park, A Treatise on the Law of Dower 
(Philadelphia, 1836), 102; W. Cruise, A Digest of the Laws of England Respecting Real Property vol. 1 
(London, 1835), 175. 
 27 
go behind Coke and examine older legal sources,104 or to look again at the statute 
itself and consider its proper interpretation.105 Williams J implied that the anti-
literalist position might be wrong, but did not feel able to disagree with Coke.106 
Whether this was indicative of a lack of scholarly initiative amongst the judiciary of 
the period, or whether deference to Coke was a convenient justification for taking the 
harsher line on c.34 is not clear.107 
 
A particularly English rule? 
As has been shown, the Coke/Woodward interpretation of c.34 was not the original 
line and does not seem to have been dominant until the nineteenth century. It might be 
added that it was not the interpretation which was always favoured in other 
jurisdictions which applied, adopted or adapted the elopement/adultery exception to 
actions of dower.108 Canada, for example, had shown an inclination to ignore Coke’s 
hard interpretation, though it was brought into line with it by the obligation to follow 
Woodward.109 U.S. jurisdictions took a variety of approaches to this piece of English 
 
104 Lack of interest in the older authorities is displayed in Park, Treatise on the Law of Dower, 
introduction, in which the author declares his intention not to go into the history of dower, since it is 
not needed for practice, and ‘may be left to the investigation of erudite curiosity’. 
105 Some writers had continued to maintain the literalist position at least into the 1840s, A Bisset, A 
Practical Treatise on the Law of Estates for Life (London, 1843). See, however, Amos, Legal 
Examiner and Law Chronicle (1833) 1, 172; L. Shelford, Practical Treatise of the Law of Marriage 
and Divorce (London,1841), which follow Coke. 
106 p. 64. 
107 Both the attitude of English courts to ‘institutional writings’ and the use of Coke’s work in decisions 
inimical to the interests of women would be interesting areas for future research. Note, for example, 
that Coke was cited as high authority in Bebb v. Law Society [1914] 1 Ch 286, 294. A consideration of 
Coke’s views and effects on women is largely absent from discussions of his work in relation to 
‘freedom’ : see Powell, ‘Coke in context’, 33-4. 
108 Note that there is a lack of evidence as to the interpretation of c.34 in Ireland, though the exception 
was certainly used (see Elizabeth Lady Dowager Boyne v Frederick Hamilton (1773) Irish Morning 
Chronicle and London Advertiser  28th August 1773 and Lloyd’s Evening Post 4th  October 1773; 
William Ball Wright, ‘The Boyne peerage case: a forgotten story of the eighteenth century’, 
Genealogical Magazine iv (1900-1) 392-7; 432-7; 497-500) and remained part of the law until its 
repeal in the Succession Act 1965, s. 11(2) and Sch. II. 
109 Graham v Law 6 U.C.C.P., 310; M.G. Cameron, A Treatise on the Law of Dower (Toronto, 1882), 
62; Woolsey v Finch 20 U.C.C.P., 132; Neff v Thompson 20 U.C.C.P. 211. 
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statute law.110 Although Coke’s influence was important on both sides of the 
Atlantic,111 his ‘purposive’ approach to s.34 on adulterous elopement was not 
approved in many U.S. cases. Frequently, though not always, both jurisdictions which 
adopted the Statute of Westminster II and those which replaced it with their own, 
similar, legislation took the words of c.34 or its equivalent in their natural, 
conjunctive sense, insisting that willing departure by the wife, as well as adultery, was 
necessary for the bar,112 thus interpreting the law in a more ‘widow-friendly’ way than 
the English orthodoxy under Hethrington, Woodward and Bostock.113 One likely 
underlying reason for the difference is the greater pressure on landed resources in 
settled and increasingly crowded England, in comparison with the expanding and 
more sparsely populated U.S.A. and Canada.114   
 
110 See, e.g., F.G. McKean, ‘British statutes in American jurisdictions’. University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 78 (1929-30), 195-230, 198; Lakin v Lakin 2 Allen (Mass.) 45, (1861).  
111 See R.S.D. Roper, Law of Property Between Husband and Wife (Buffalo, NY, 1820)  548; C.H. 
Scribner, A Treatise on the Law of Dower (Philadelphia, 1867), 2 vols. 498. 
112 See, e.g. Reynolds v Reynolds 24 Wendell (NY) 193, Beaty v Richardson 56 SC 173, 34 SE 73; 46 
LRA 517, Jarnigan v Jarnigan 12 Lea (Tenn.) 292; Reel v Elder 62 Pa 308; Walters v Jordan 35 NC 
361 57 Am Dec 558; 13 Ired. 361; Shaffer v Richardson’s administrator  27 Ind. 122,; Coggswell v 
Tibbets 3 NH 41; Heslop v Heslop 62 Pa. St. 527; Rawlins v Buttel 1 Houst. (Del.) 224;; T.E. Atkinson, 
Handbook of the Law of Wills (St Paul, 1953), 149, E. P Hopkins, Handbook on the Law of Real 
Property (St Paul, 1896), p. 103 no. 60; C.T. Boone, A Manual of the Law of Real Property (San 
Francisco, 1883) p. 73.  
113 See, e.g., H. Turtletaub, ‘Misconduct in the marital relation: adultery as a bar to dower’, University 
of Miami Law Review 13 (1958), 83-91; Lakin v Lakin 84 Mass 45 (1861); Davis v Davis (1918) Wis. ; 
167 NW 879. Some legislation essentially replicated the scheme of c. 34, while, elsewhere, divorce 
rather than elopement and/or adultery, became the barring event: J. Kent, Commentaries on American 
Law 4 vols (New York, 1826-30), IV, 52-3; Reynolds v Reynolds 24 Wend (NY) 193 (1840).  
A deliberate move away from the Hethrington – Woodward line can be seen in the 
Connecticut law specifically giving dower to a woman who was absent from her husband ‘by his 
consent or by his default’ when he died: Scribner, Treatise on the Law of Dower, II, 502. Other 
formulations avoided the elopement question by simply saying that the bar applied if the wife 
committed adultery and was not living with the husband at the time of his death: Phillips v Wiseman 
131 NC 402 42 SE 861 (1902).  
One would expect, in different political and legal conditions, that property law would develop 
its own independent character, See, e.g. P. Girard, ‘Rethinking ‘the nation’ in national legal history, a 
Canadian perspective’, LHR 89 (2011), 607-26; C. Shammas, ‘Reassessing the Married Women’s 
Property Acts’, Journal of Women’s History 6 (1994), 9-30; M. Salmon, Women and the Law of 
Property in Early America (Chapel Hill NC, 1986); A.D. Morantz, There’s no place like home: 
homestead exemptions and judicial constructions of family in nineteenth century America’, LHR 24 
(2006) 245-95. 
114 Also worthy of consideration are the different attitudes to equity in England and the American 
states, and the availability of alternative models of family provision which could be imitated by the 




Interpretation of the elopement/adultery exception under Statute of 
Westminster II c.34 had moved slowly over five centuries from a relatively ‘widow-
friendly’ view, allowing those widows who had only settled down with another man 
after leaving the matrimonial home because of mistreatment by a husband or 
abduction to claim their dower, to a ‘widow-unfriendly’ view, allowing the heir or 
other tenant to oppose dower in such cases. The ‘widow-unfriendly’ interpretation 
triumphed only in the nineteenth century, when social, legal and policy factors 
combined to produce conditions receptive to an interpretation which misrepresented 
the apparent intention of the medieval legislator and the understanding of the 
legislation which prevailed into the early modern period,115 preferring the ‘widow-
unfriendly’ view of Coke. 
The slow move and disagreement as to the correct interpretation of the law on 
dower gave rise to vagueness in the legal position of women such as will be familiar 
to those who have looked at the history of women’s rights with relation to corporal 
punishment by a husband, or to their non-judicial imprisonment, and which could be 
as detrimental to them as some of the clearer-cut rules of coverture and sex-based 
disqualification.116  
The nineteenth century change in interpretation of c.34 contrasts with what 
might be seen as ‘pro-woman’ moves such as the tendency towards a focus on lack of 
 
115 Westminster II c. 34 had not been a straightforwardly moralising piece of legislation, and was 
probably passed to deal with concerns of relatively large scale landowners that they should not be at 
risk of their land passing to women who had laid them open to public disgrace and dishonour by 
deserting them with (or for) a rival, while allowing them to reconcile with erring wives if dynastic 
circumstances (rather than the Church) dictated that course of action. 
116 See, e.g., M. Doggett, Marriage, Wife-Beating and the Law in Victorian England (London, 1992); 
G. Seabourne, Imprisoning Medieval Women: the non-judicial confinement and abduction of women in 
England c.1170-1509 (Farnham, 2011). 
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consent as opposed to force and resistance in the law of rape,117 changes in divorce 
procedure and a decrease in the seriousness of conduct which qualified as ‘cruelty’ in 
the divorce context, allowing a slightly larger pool of women to escape miserable 
marriages, and an increase in the evidential requirements for proof of adultery,118 
preventing some men from divorcing their wives so easily as in the past., an increase 
in the likelihood of a divorced mother obtaining custody of young children,119 and the 
matrimonial property acts.120 With dower declining in importance, and never 
applicable to those couples who owned no real property, a change in the interpretation 
of c.34 might not have made a widespread difference to the lives of women in 
England and Wales, but it was indicative of opposition to women’s property rights 
and should be considered alongside the more familiar narrative of ‘progress’ in this 
area.121  The adoption of a harsh interpretation of c.34 in the nineteenth century might 
be seen as a significant counter-current, stirred up by the legal establishment against 
the flow of property rights to women, or as a particular opposition to the adultery and 
lack of respectability of women of moderate means, of the sort who were likely to 
claim dower, and is thus worthy of consideration in discussions of both gender and 
class attitudes on the part of nineteenth century lawyers. 
 
117 The apparent lowering of the standard for volition, in particular, may be contrasted with the slight 
nineteenth century moves towards a less complainant-unfriendly standard of consent in rape cases: see, 
e.g. K. Smith, ‘Criminal Law’ in W. Cornish et. al., Oxford History of the Laws of England vol. XIII: 
1820-1914 Fields of Development, (Oxford, 2010), 1-464, 404, on the (slight) moves in the nineteenth 
century with regard to the concept of consent to sex in rape cases. Note, in particular, R. v. Camplin 
(1845) 1 Den 89 and R. v. Fletcher (1859) Bell 63, in which reference is made to the Westminster II 
c.34 ravishment provision. In this case, they were arguably incorrect, confusing the offence of rape 
with that of raptus: see Seabourne, Imprisoning Medieval Women, Appendix. 
118 L. Stone, Broken Lives: separation and divorce in England 1550-1857 (Oxford, 1993), 10; Stone, 
Road to Divorce, 205. 
119 Custody of Infants Act 1839; Matrimonial Causes Act 1857.  
120 Matrimonial Causes Act 1857; Married Women’s Property Act 1870; Matrimonial Causes Act 
1878; Married Women’s Property Act 1882;  Married Women’s Property Act 1893; M.L. Stanley, 
‘One must ride behind’ married women’s rights and the Divorce Act of 1857’, Victorian Studies, 25 
(1981-2) 364-5; L. Holcombe, Wives and Property (Oxford, 1983); V. Ulrich, ‘The reform of married 
women’s property law in England during the nineteenth century’ Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review (1977)13-36.  
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The possibility of claiming dower was removed in 1925, as dower in the case 
of intestacy was replaced by new modes of provision for widows (and other family 
members), modelled on the rules for distribution of personal property, and with no 
possibility of exception on grounds of adultery or elopement. Some movement in this 
direction had already taken place in the Intestate Estates Act 1890.122 Adultery and/or 
desertion was now only relevant to provision for those who had been married to a 
man who predeceased them in so far as they had been grounds for a successful and 
completed divorce during his life. Widows’ entitlements were no longer subject to the 
possibility of a court’s judgment on their sexual propriety during the course of a 
marriage and there need be no further debate about the importance of a conjunction in 




121 It could also be contrasted with the ‘silent decriminalisation’ of adultery noted by Stone: Stone, 
Road to Divorce, 232, a development which he dates to the early eighteenth century.  
122 J.H.C. Morris, ‘Intestate succession to land in the conflict of laws’, 85 LQR (1969) 339 – 49, 348; 
C.H. Sherrin and R.C. Bonehill, The Law and Practice of Intestate Succession 3rd  edn, (London, 
2004), 34.  
